

What is the case for a security and justice focus in development assistance programming?

An assessment of existing literature and evidence

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Introduction

This literature review on security and justice was commissioned by DFID and is intended to support the preparation of the new DFID White Paper on 'Securing our Common Future'. The purpose of the literature review is to find evidence to support the 'case for security and justice'. The key question it asks is why DFID (and other development agencies) should see security and justice as core business?

The Terms of Reference identified three areas of focus:

- (a) whether the poor consider security and justice needs as priorities (building on 2000 World Bank "Voices of the Poor" study);
- (b) the extent to which security and justice are necessary to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (they underpin them, the cost of wars, effect which insecurity has on development, etc.); and
- (c) actual examples of the effect on the poor when security and justice needs are not met (e.g. armed violence statistics, effect on MDGs, etc.)

Security and justice potentially have many different dimensions which affect human welfare, but for the purpose of this review we define security and justice in terms of access to a minimum level of private and public safety and law and order. From this standpoint, insecurity and injustice stem from problems such as crime, violence and weak or dysfunctional criminal justice systems that contribute to the breakdown of law and order and public safety.

The paper is broken down into three sections which address each of these sets of issues. By way of conclusion, the paper identifies a number of key gaps in the knowledge base on security and justice issues and briefly discusses some of the implications of the current state of knowledge in this area for donor assistance programming. This review did not cover the literature on security and justice programming, which is the subject of another review being conducted concurrently.

Perspectives and Relevance of Security and Justice to the Poor

What is the evidence from the literature about where poor people rank security and justice in relation to their other material and physical needs? How do poor people perceive and define security and justice in themselves and in relation to poverty and development goals? How does this (including the lack of security and justice) define their status, identity, daily routines and future aspirations? What is the evidence that security and justice are existential needs accorded utmost priority by the poor, and which must be given a higher policy priority alongside other development goals?

Since the writings of Amartya Sen in the 1990s (emphasising a freedom, justice and human rights as key elements of development), followed up by the 1997 *Human Development Report* entitled Poverty and Development, the academic and policy literature has pointed to the multidimensional nature of poverty, including the role and impact of security and justice on the lives of poor people. Most of the arguments and evidence presented in the literature in the 1990s were captured in the World Bank's "Voices of the Poor" project, a survey and consultative study of poor people in 23 low and middle income countries conducted over a period of a several years¹.

According to this survey, which formed the basis of the 2000/1 *World Development Report*, security and freedom of action and choice - two important elements of security and justice - constitute integral components of poor people's definition and dimensions of wellbeing. Well-being was defined by poor people as the expression or presence of happiness, harmony, peace, freedom from anxiety and peace of mind.²

The survey produced qualitative data indicating that the poor think of security in terms of their ability to survive in the face of rising corruption, crime, violence, lack of protection from the police and the absence of recourse to justice, ethnic, tribal and clan violence, natural disasters and the uncertainties of climate. The report also notes the centrality of corruption, violence and powerlessness, all symptomatic of security and justice failings, as key components of ill-being.

The survey points to poor people as both victims and perpetrators (as a source of livelihood) of violence and crime. In Brazil, for example, the survey shows that fears about violence in the street (in the *favelas*) keep women from work and girls from school, and also drive young boys towards criminality. The views of poor people also indicate that these security and justice shortfalls impact upon poor people in general and that there are important gender dimensions to the problem, not least of which are domestic violence and other forms of gender-based violence.

The survey conveys poor people's views that failings in security and justice provisioning underlie social fragmentation as crime and violence, lawlessness and migration (and displacement) combine to undermine social cohesion.³ There is a common complaint that the poor do not have access to justice due to a lack of information and distance from courts, and also a strong belief that only money buys or secures justice. The survey reported poor people's negative perceptions of the police and other security and justice agencies of the state, which are seen as largely unhelpful and as sources of harm, risk and impoverishment. Among the five themes identified by poor people as crucial to transforming poverty, two security and justice issues also emerged relating to corruption and violence.

The findings and conclusion of the World Bank survey have been replicated and reinforced in subsequent empirical surveys. For instance, the June 2005 Report of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on "Crime and Development in Africa" notes that crime, an issue at the intersection of security and justice needs, undermines development through the erosion of social and human capital, discourages foreign investment, and undermines the state's capacity to promote development, including poverty alleviation. The report uses additional evidence (surveys) to show that poor women, who face additional threats of sexual violence and harassment, may be more strongly affected than men. Surveys in Jamaica show that girls were afraid to go to school because of violence; in South Africa education opportunities are limited when and where attending class means exposure to sexual violence, including at the hand of teachers.

In a national victim survey (including poor people) in South Africa, 26% of respondents stated that crime prevented them from starting their own business and 24% stated that they could not use public transportation because of fear of crime (a serious issue in a country where the majority of black people have no means of accessing urban markets or work opportunities).

The report also cites a World Bank survey which found that fear of crime was limiting the movement of women in one poor community in Zambia where 93% said they felt unsafe, and that the fear of crime was preventing teachers from showing up at work. The Zambian survey also indicated that crime was second to water supply in the hierarchy of concerns by women, and that evening school classes were terminated due to the vandalism of schools and other public institutions. This is consistent with the findings of International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) data that show that Africans feel less safe (than respondents in other regions) walking at night in the areas where they live, which exacerbates poverty by limiting social and commercial interaction.⁴

Several surveys of marginalised and vulnerable youth in conflict-affected and fragile states such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Ghana showed the centrality of security and justice needs in the lives and experience of poverty among respondents. According to Paul Richards's anthropological surveys among poor youth in rural areas of Liberia and Sierra Leone, many participated in armed warfare (as members of rebel groups and community defence forces) largely due to the lack of justice. Exploitation by rural Chiefs imposing heavy fines and criminal summons was also a common factor. In many cases, youth were forced to run away from villages in order to evade arrest and payment of heavy fines.⁵

A similar study by Thandika Mkandawire concluded that the involvement of poor rural youth in armed conflict around the Mano River region is linked to the invasion or disruption of farming and agriculture by rebel groups.⁶ Also, a recent survey of vulnerable and excluded youth in seven West African countries (listed above) by the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King's College London concludes that physical safety and security, and societal justice connected with equitable generational representation and participation in decision-

making, rank alongside educational and employment opportunities as key priorities among poor youth.⁷

Another survey by the Feinstein International Famine Center, entitled "Mapping the Security Environment", evaluated the perspectives of local communities in conflict-affected countries (Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone) on the meanings and importance of security. One of the overarching findings of the study was that communities (including poor people) tend to have a holistic understanding of security, encompassing physical and "human security" concerns such as jobs, access to services, and freedom of expression. The latter concerns gain prominence as conflict recedes, but conversely are kept alive by the prospect that unaddressed needs or grievances may again flare into active hostilities. For local communities, human security is a precondition for physical security.⁸

In Afghanistan, the study cites results of two surveys: the first is a nationwide survey by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission showing that 80% of the over 6,000 respondents say that "there can be no peace without justice"; the second shows that a similar percentage believes that unless the guns are taken away and the warlords are held to account, there will be no durable peace. Moreover, across rural and urban Afghanistan, the link between unemployment, crime and warlordism was cited by respondents as key concerns that affect their daily lives. Issues of physical security were paramount and were expressed in terms of a desire to see the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remain in the country, and warlords neutralised (through employment generation). A close second priority was to reform the corrupt police service.

In rural Afghanistan, poor people define security in terms of their tribe or tribal structures and identity. This is said to be rooted in the centrality of tribal councils in managing or providing security. Within this, women have specific concerns such as girls being at risk of kidnap on the way to school, and women no longer in purdah facing more harassment by young men in the street. Women see peace as an issue of governance and failure of services, including the non-functioning of the judicial system. The study concludes that respondents rate *negative* peace (absence of armed conflict) over and as a precondition for *positive* peace (stable and secure livelihoods).

In Kosovo, the study notes that physical security is patchy and of paramount importance to the lives of ethnic minorities (for Serbs in Kosovar Albanian areas and vice versa). The report documents huge restrictions on the freedom of movement and pervasive fear of harassment and physical assault by ethnic minorities. In particular, the study points to the inability of girls to go to school due to fear of kidnap and physical assault by rival ethnic group members. The study concludes with a paradoxical perception of the international military force (KFOR) by the rival ethnic groups, as both a saviour and a source of tension and division (of Serbia) by Kosovar Albanians and Serbs respectively.

Still, the two contrasting perspectives underscore the importance of security and justice issues, denoted by physical safety, prevention of violence and lawlessness as undertaken by KFOR. In Sierra Leone, the study found that robbery (including theft) is the most common security and perhaps existential problem faced by poor people. According to one respondent, “there is a lot of theft, but it is mainly the poor that get robbed – the poor rob the poor.”⁹ The prevalence of robberies has prompted community-level formation of self-help security patrols involving young people. The study also documents poor people’s (especially those most affected by the war) bitterness about security and justice shortfalls connected with the perception that perpetrators of wartime human rights abuses and crime have been rewarded. This is coupled with poor people’s negative views of the justice system which is seen as corrupt, ineffective and inefficient, underfunded and inaccessible to them.

A 2008 review of existing knowledge on measuring the impact of security and justice on development undertaken by Agulhas Development Consultants for DFID notes that existing theories and literature on justice and poverty alleviation are rooted in bottom-up approaches that argue that justice is not just a means of achieving development, but also an intrinsic part of the development process. It cites the 2008 report of the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor which concludes that enforceable property rights are essential to empowering women in rural and urban settings, alleviating poverty and malnutrition, and building strong families and businesses.¹⁰ The review notes that this underscores claims that injustice, physical insecurity and powerlessness are at the heart of the subjective experience of poverty.

The review also notes that there is strong evidence of the direct impact which a lack of security and justice has on poor people’s lives, by increasing vulnerability and tipping households into destitution. The review concludes that the causal links between security and justice and poverty alleviation are specific and context dependent, highlighting three general ways in which security and justice shortfalls affect poor people. These are through loss of land, housing and livelihood as a result of insecure property rights; through becoming victims of crime involving direct costs (injury and mortality, lost property) and indirect costs (lower participation in workforce, worse educational outcomes); and through discrimination or persecution at the hands of more powerful individuals, in particular discrimination against poor women (lack of economic opportunities, mistreatment and dispossession of widows).

Other surveys include qualitative assessments of the experiences and perspectives of poor people in conflict-affected communities. According to a December 2008 assessment of poor civilians in the Vanni region of Sri Lanka, poor people are said to be trapped and maltreated by rival combatants (LTTE and Government forces). The situation is said to be worsened by the government ban on humanitarian and media access. The report found evidence that the plight of poor civilians in the region continued to be worsened by forced recruitment of civilians, widespread use of abusive forced labour and improper and unjustified restrictions on civilians’ freedom of movement.¹¹

A similar survey of the plight of poor civilians in Northern Yemen in November 2008 concluded that a majority of the up to 130,000 displaced people caught between government forces and the Huthis armed group remain inaccessible to humanitarian agencies. From interviews with poor civilians, the report documents the destruction of civilian socio-economic infrastructures including houses, schools, roads, health facilities, shops and markets, and also their displacement and numerous deaths.¹²

Similar surveys and assessments in places like Zimbabwe and Somalia produce parallel observations. The January 2009 assessment in Zimbabwe by Human Rights Watch expressly links humanitarian crises (cholera pandemic and collapsed health system and livelihoods) to political oppression and injustice, and physical insecurity. Through

interviews with poor rural farmers, the report highlights how state-led violence and insecurity and victimisation led to economic collapse and food shortage (as a result of hoarded and politically motivated distribution of seeds and fertilisers).

The report also notes that political violence and injustice has increased the rate of maternal mortality to a level of 880 per 100,000 live births (2005 figures), contributing to over 2,000 deaths and 39,000 infections from cholera and run-away inflation, all of which combine to worsen the plight of poor Zimbabweans.¹³ A December 2008 assessment and survey in Somalia also notes how poor people, especially women, continue to suffer from acute security and justice failings. For instance, the report documents how the Bakara market in Mogadishu has become a scene of regular fire-fights between rival forces, resulting in the looting of produce and wares by insurgents and armed groups and increased rape of women.¹⁴

Overall, this review shows that there is extensive evidence in existing literature that poor people across conflict-affected, fragile and low-income societies have strong opinions about the relevance of security and justice in their daily lives. The perspectives and relevance (and consequences) differ for men and women; children, youth and adults; and from one region to another. Nonetheless, the review shows a commonality of views about the importance of security and justice for poor people.

Security and Justice Needs as Crucial to Meeting the MDGs

Within the literature, what claims are made and evidence presented that meeting security and justice needs are crucial to achieving the developmental goals enunciated under the MDGs? Do security and justice needs constitute critical thresholds in the outbreak of armed conflicts? What are the linkages between acute security and justice shortfalls and slow progress in meeting MDGs? What is the impact of self-help (non-state) approaches to meeting security and justice needs? Finally, what does the literature say about the role, centrality and viability of the state in matters of security and justice provisioning?

In their book *War and Underdevelopment*, Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald put forward the idea that acute security and justice shortfalls in the context of armed conflicts in developing countries lead to human costs that transcend death, to include the widespread loss of livelihoods caused by the dislocation of economy and society. They note that *indirect* civilian casualties, often affecting the poorest people and linked to lack of access to food and health facilities, represent the biggest source or impact of conflict on poor people. The human costs of war inadvertently lead to the loss of entitlement – all forms of legal income from work, assets and transfers that accrue to people – for the poor.

While the study did not address the argument (made in other literature) that acute security and justice shortfalls can and do create entitlement for some people (often in minority) during conflict situations, the evidence is that poor people tend to suffer most in conflict situations. The study also notes the impact of security and justice shortfalls on households through changes in their composition as adult men join fighting forces, are killed or migrate; as women acquire greater responsibilities as head and chief provider; and as opportunities for women and younger family members open up (in some cases) as traditional attitudes are undermined by war.¹⁵

According to Murshed, conflict in low-income countries makes the objective of poverty reduction all the more difficult, since not only is growth retarded, public money is taken for military from basic social services, and the poor are themselves disproportionately the victims of conflict. He concludes that state failure in providing security and a minimal level of public goods often forces individuals to rely on kinship ties for support and security.¹⁶

Also, Frances Stewart¹⁷ and Robert Picciotto¹⁸, in two separate studies, pinpoint the strong relationship between progress in achieving the MDGs and security and justice provisioning. Stewart notes three connections between development and security (and justice issues) to include impacts of security/insecurity on wellbeing and development achievements; the way insecurity affects (non-security) elements; and the way development affects security. She concludes that security is part of the definition of development, that developing countries in conflict frequently show regress rather than progress on

the MDG indicators, and that the incidence of conflict is heavy among low-achieving countries, so their failure is especially serious in terms of prolonging deprivation and poverty. Besides the direct impact of war on rates of death, injury and flight, she argues that conflict undermines the economy and government capacity with serious implications for achieving the MDGs. As such, acute security and justice shortfalls entrap low-income countries in a vicious cycle of Conflict-MDG failure.

Picciotto's analysis affirms the major thrust of Stewart's findings in his conclusion that intrastate war (a major marker of acute security and justice failings) of various kinds have become the dominant feature of the security environment, setting development back over vast zones of the developing world. On average, he argues, the cost of a single conflict approaches the value of annual development aid worldwide. He further notes that the average cost of a civil war is two and a half times the value of the country's GDP at the time the conflict starts. He underlined the global impact of such acute security and justice shortfalls in developing countries by noting that the development needs and failure of fragile states involves risks of international instability through creating pressures for external intervention, provision of safe havens for terrorist groups, and a fertile ground for promoting extremist ideologies.

The above analyses were reinforced by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) during the 51st meeting of its Commission on Narcotic Drugs which noted that drug control, crime prevention, terrorism prevention and criminal justice, together with peace, security and development, are essential for building safe, just and healthy societies. The commission also concluded that a fair, effective and credible criminal justice system promotes long term socio-economic and human development and shields societies from the effects of crime, trafficking, corruption and instability.¹⁹

Other empirical studies tend to validate the assumptions and findings of direct relationship between security and justice needs, and developmental goals. The 2005 study by the Bradford Centre for International Cooperation and Security, entitled "The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development", focused on crime and conflict-affected communities in 13 low and medium income countries in the Global South. The study

concludes that armed violence, especially the use of small arms and light weapons, has had almost entirely negative impacts on poverty and development through displacement, damage to education, health, and agriculture, and impoverishment of large sections of communities and populations.

Although the Bradford study notes rare instances where armed violence creates opportunities for social and institutional change that can lead some individuals out of poverty, it reaffirms that the general impact of conflict is negative for the wider population. In relation to the MDGs, the study notes that armed violence invariably hold back development and worsens or frustrates poverty alleviation through loss of livelihoods, unemployment, displacement and changes in household composition and roles that all either roll back modest gains or hinder progress in meeting MDGs.

Importantly, the study also notes how acute security and justice shortfalls, especially the inability of the state to maintain law and order, has generated negative forms of employment for unemployed youth through their formation and membership of self-help security and justice outfits (or self-styled youth gangs) like the Maras in El-Salvador, and the Bakassi Boys and Odua People's Congress in Nigeria. The non-state outfits and alternative machineries of security and justice provisioning are noted to have mixed impacts on development, relieving insecurity and injustice in the short-term (often without recourse to formal rule of law processes) and aggravating insecurity and injustice over the long-term through extra-judicial killings, ethnicization, alignment with partisan political agendas, and the emergence of protection rackets.²⁰

Paul Collier also provides statistical evidence to show the cost of acute security and justice failings in the form of armed conflict on poverty and development broadly defined. He notes that one year of conflict reduces a country's growth rate by 2.2%, and since on average each conflict last for seven years, the economy will be 15% smaller at the end of the war than if the war had not taken place. He notes that it will take roughly ten years (17 years after the conflict started) for a country's economy to return to its pre-war growth rate. As such the total economic cost, expressed as a present value at the start of the war, is 105% of the GDP at that point. Also, by the end of a typical war, incomes are found to be 15%

lower than would otherwise have been the case, implying that about 30% more people are living in absolute poverty.²¹

Collier also notes that apart from higher levels of military spending (that often corresponds to lower investment in basic social services for poor people), conflict affects civilians' human health through the Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) – a measure of the total number of people affected and the period for which their disability lasts. An average war causes an estimated 0.5 million DALYs each year, translating into about \$5 billion. When expanded to cover regional impacts, Collier concludes that the total national and regional cost of a single war is more than \$64 billion.

Similarly, the UNODC 2008 Crime Prevention Handbook in Southern and Caribbean Regions, citing evidence-based crime surveys by partner institutions, found that poorer, less-developed countries are likely to have higher crime rates than more developed countries. It documents the impact of security and justice shortfalls on poor individuals to include the negative impact on livelihood and local social institutions.²² The report ends by restating the World Health Organisation's (WHO) assertion that violence is a major public health issue and one of its recognised five pandemics in the world.

The report also reproduces WHO's table on how violence obstructs progress towards the MDGs.²³ The table, on the issue of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, for example, notes that interpersonal and collective violence can reduce local and national economic performance, the impact of which falls most harshly on the poorest fifth of populations. It also finds that collective violence disrupts production and distribution of food, contributing to prevalence of underweight children and below-minimum diet in the general population. On achieving universal primary education, it shows that violence at home is linked to reduced attendance and poor performance and non-completion of studies by children, and that collective violence disrupts education systems and can rob generations of children of the right to education. On achieving gender equality and women empowerment, it notes that violence in and around schools is a major reason keeping some girls out of school and education completely.

On other MDGs, the report highlights various ways in which shortfalls in security and justice undermine progress, both in its positive (improvement in security and justice provisioning leading to improved progress on MDGs) and negative (security and justice shortfalls impeding progress) dimensions. The WHO findings are paralleled by those of the 2008 UN MDGs Report that concludes that conflict continues to displace people from their homes and drive them into poverty, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons across the world.²⁴

In summary, this review of literature shows that there is a strong conceptual basis and empirical evidence to back it to argue that security and justice shortfalls are a major constraint on efforts to meet the MDGs. The review also shows that by improving the size of "zones" of security and justice (areas where poor people have access to improved security and justice), not only is an enabling environment being created for development and poverty alleviation, but also that MDGs are being directly and indirectly promoted. In short, increasing security and justice empowers the poor in ways which allow them to drive and benefit from processes of development.

How (a lack of) Security and Justice Impacts upon the MDGs

What examples are given in the literature from different regions of the world of the ways in which failings in security and justice provisioning, often denoted by armed violence, contribute to poverty? In particular, how do these failings impact upon daily routines and livelihood patterns? How do they impact upon critical developmental infrastructures and processes? And how do they influence *negative* employment (i.e. where youth become members/employees of armed groups and militias, kidnappers, etc.) in conflict-affected, fragile and stable but low-income states across the developing world?

There is a growing body of literature that documents the empirical connections between shortfalls in security and justice and lack of progress on development goals. The Households in Conflict Network (HiCN), based at the Institute of Development Studies, for instance, focuses on the micro study of the impacts of insecurity on the socio-economic and material wellbeing of poor households in

developing countries²⁵. Many of the HiCN surveys and studies demonstrate the connections between security and justice shortfalls and developmental goals (education, poverty and hunger, health, etc).

For example, a study by Ibanez and Moya on the impact of intra-state conflict on the economic welfare of poor people in Colombia found that civil conflict and the displacement it generates impose heavy burdens upon the civil population. Losses to their welfare include asset loss, constraints on income, and disruption of risk sharing mechanisms which obliges households to rely on costly strategies in order to sustain their consumption. These losses are as important in the short as in the medium and long term.²⁶ Another study on conflict displacement and labour market outcomes in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina found that displaced men and women are less likely to be in work relative to those who are not displaced.²⁷

Two similar studies on displacement and output and productivity in Rwanda and Burundi also offer evidence of the direct connection (positive and negative) between security and justice failing and the welfare of poor people. The Rwanda study found that while the genocide and the displacement it caused increased poverty for refugees and displaced people, their return home is associated with higher motivation and increased agricultural output, relative to stayers and non-displaced people, although in the context of increased security and justice provisioning.²⁸ The Burundi study found that poverty is persistent while prosperity is not, in particular war-affected areas. It reports that 25 war-related deaths or injuries at the village level reduces consumption growth by 13%; that violence afflicted on household members decreases growth, whereas membership of groups, including armed groups, increases it; and that famine-induced migration and illness decrease growth while good harvests and higher initial levels of education increase it.²⁹

Other related studies on the impact of violence on poor people in Rwanda also indicate how security and justice shortfalls affected children's health, schooling and educational achievement. A 2006 study found that girls born between 1987 and 1991 after a shock in a region experiencing crop failure and civil conflict exhibit lower height for their age and that this translates into worse impact on household productivity. This is rooted in the

failure or limited capacity of households in conflict and crop-failure affected areas to protect their offspring from the impact of the shocks. The study notes the absence of evidence on the impact of these shocks on boys' health status.³⁰

The 2008 study by Akresh and de Walque on links between the genocide and schooling found that school-age children exposed to the genocide experienced a drop in educational achievement of almost one-half year of completed schooling and were less likely to complete third or fourth grade. As such, it concludes that the negative schooling impact of the genocide will have long term impact as it is likely to affect adult productivity and wages.³¹ A similar study by Shemyakina on violence and children's school in Tajikistan also concluded that exposure to conflict had a significant negative effect on the enrolment of girls and a little or no effect on boys. As such, armed conflict may have created significant regional and generational disparities in the level of education attained by women.³²

A related study on the dynamics of poverty and conflict in Rwanda found convergence between provinces following the conflict shocks: previously richer provinces in the east and in the north of the country experienced lower, even negative economic growth compared to the poorer western and southern provinces.³³

Further research and studies undertaken by the United Nations and its agencies, and international rights advocacy groups provide empirical evidence of the connections between insecurity and injustice and the plight of poor people. The March 2008 UNODC study on the patterns and impacts of crime in low-income conflict-affected and fragile states in the Balkans found that despite improvements in security and the crime situation (associated with robberies, burglaries, assault, kidnap, etc) in South-Eastern and European countries, they continue to be vulnerable to organised criminal networks and activities whose effect reverberates into Western Europe. The report documents human trafficking, corruption and fraud, drugs and narcotics, etc. among crimes associated with the criminal networks. The report concluded that organised and economic crimes in South-Eastern Europe threaten democracy, rule of law, human rights, stability and socio-economic progress in the region. The report, citing a 2007 discovery of an arms cache

sufficient to equip 650 soldiers and anti-aircraft weaponry traced to criminal groups, hinted that organised criminal networks and crime will be a key issue in future armed conflict in the region.³⁴

The October 2008 UNODC Report on Narco-Trafficking in the Americas also highlights the connections between the socio-economic conditions that give rise to poverty, the drug trade and crime. The drug trade gives rise to violent crimes (murders), money laundering, human trafficking, corruption and the spread of street gangs. All of this tends to negatively affect the larger population, including poor people, by undermining the economy and governance. Economic issues and crime emerged in the survey as the two greatest problems faced by ordinary people in Latin America. It concludes that both issues are inter-related as crime and corruption are derailing economic development in some instances.³⁵

Similarly, the UNODC November 2008 report on Drug Trafficking in West Africa found that the drug trade flourishes in the region due to ineffective security and criminal justice systems and that the trade constitutes a security threat to the poor and governments of countries in West Africa. Specifically, the report notes that at least 46 tons of cocaine have been seized en route to Europe via West Africa since 2005, and that the greatest point of vulnerability lies in the region's under-resourced criminal justice agencies that are susceptible to corruption.³⁶

Evidence of the huge impact of which drugs, warlordism and organised crime, all at the intersection of security and justice, have on poor people and development is also provided in UNODC's 2008 Annual and World Drug Reports. The reports examine countries like Guinea Bissau where high level corruption and the near total absence of the rule of law allow drug gangs to operate with impunity. Although the reports do not make any direct connection between this problem of impunity and Guinea Bissau's huge levels of poverty and slow progress of the MDGs, its macro analysis of the imperative for security and justice reform underscores how the drug trade can undermine development.³⁷

The focus on Afghanistan displays the potential and real connections between security and justice provisioning, and the welfare of poor people. The UNODC reports establish the direct relationship between opium production

and insecurity in Afghanistan by demonstrating, first, that opium is cultivated by poor farmer and its cultivation tends to increase where and when prices are high; second, that continued cultivation is concentrated in the Southern region where insecurity and insurgency is highest; and third, that insurgent groups (Taliban and anti-governments elements) raise a large part of their income through taxes imposed on opium farmers.

Conversely, despite similar high levels of poverty in centre-north Afghanistan, opium cultivation is observed to have diminished largely due to improved security conditions and programmes for farmers that provide alternatives to opium production. The UNODC survey in its January 2009 assessment pinpoints that 60% of villages with poor security and 51% of those with very poor security are involved in opium cultivation, as compared to only 12% and 4% of villages with good and very good security.³⁸

Extant literature also points to the possible connections between security and justice issues and the welfare and wellbeing of poor people in other contexts, particularly conflict-affected (post-conflict) and fragile states. For example, the MDG progress reports produced by the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia, two post-conflict countries, point to the legacies (negative impacts) of past security and justice failings in the post-war period, not least of which are the high crime rates (robberies, rape, theft and burglaries) in the serious challenges the countries face in meeting the MDGs. The Sierra Leone report for 2005 shows that over 70% of the country's 4.9 million people continue to live below the poverty line, and high unemployment and under-employment, destruction of major socio-economic infrastructures, disruption of agriculture and mining, over two million people displaced and a 50% drop in national income, exist all as a result of the ten-year civil war. The report also documents that more than 40% of children under the age of five are too short for their age, indicating high levels of malnutrition. In addition, only 30% of adults are literate, and many schools were destroyed during the war. Conversely, the return to peace is said to have boosted primary school enrolment from 65% in 2000 to over 90% by 2003.³⁹

The Government of Liberia's 2004 assessment show similar patterns highlighting that schools, health facilities, feeder roads, power supply systems, water and sanitation

infrastructures were destroyed during the war. The country faces serious challenges in achieving the MDGs on account of its 76% poverty rate (with extreme poverty increasing from 14% in 1997 to 52% in 2001) and unprecedented levels of malnutrition across the country.⁴⁰ Similarly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) January 2009 assessment of Liberia makes logical connections between the socio-economic threats confronted by the people and government of Liberia and security and justice shortfalls manifested in terms of violent crime and vigilantism and disputes over lands and property rights across the country.⁴¹

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the ICG in their individual assessments and reports on the plight of civilians in conflict-affected communities and fragile states also produce empirical evidence and cases of the connection (often the negative impacts) between security and justice and the wellbeing of poor people. Through interviews with poor people, HRW provides evidence of how the breakdown of security and justice systems occasioned by armed clashes between Kenyan forces and the Sabaot Land Defence Force militia group over a complex mix of land disputes, criminality and struggles for local power have made killing, rape and mutilation, displacement and torture a regular reality in the lives of poor people in Kenya's Western Mount Elgon district.⁴² The ICG July 2008 report on Guinea Bissau documents both the extreme poverty of the population (especially in the countryside) as indexed by its 175th place out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index, the spectre of socio-economic threats to the country, and the failure to institute security and justice reforms after its civil war.⁴³

A similar report on Tajikistan in February 2009 shows an unusual, yet reaffirming relationship between security, justice and developmental goals. The continued flow of Western aid and finance to the incumbent regime, on account of its support for the international fight against terrorism, continues to be siphoned off by corrupt officials rather than invested in social sectors such as education and health, both at the heart of the MDGs.⁴⁴

Also, the ICG 2007 report on Haiti notes that crime, lawlessness, and increased poverty are connected to security and justice shortfalls, including the looting of courthouses and prisons, resulting in increased crime; dysfunctional judicial systems where there are no records, poor case management, incompetent and poorly trained judges and officials, underfunding and outdated legal

codes. Most importantly, the report highlights that these issues tend to be poorly understood or ignored when it comes to explaining the failure of interventions by donor countries and agencies.⁴⁵

Not surprisingly, the ICG notes similar patterns in its October 2007 report on Southern Thailand where the conduct of government forces and its paramilitary allies in combating Muslim separatists in the Southern region is noted to have generated attacks on markets, mosques and on poor villagers by all sides.⁴⁶

In summary, there is a growing body of micro (household level) and macro (societal level) evidence that connects the well-being and ill-being of poor people directly with advances and shortfalls in security and justice provisioning, respectively. The literature demonstrates convincingly the immense limitations of the MDGs without the strategic consideration of security and justice concerns and their incorporation into broader developmental agendas, policies and programming. Problems of crime, violence, corruption, and displacement transcend their traditional qualification as 'security' and 'justice' issues, and need to be understood as critical drivers, constraints and conditioners of development.

Conclusions

There is a growing body of empirical evidence to support the argument that shortfalls in security and justice are at the heart of poverty, underdevelopment and setbacks in meeting MDGs. Yet, in as much as there is a growing body of evidence to support the *case* for security and justice assistance programmes by donors, the question of how best this assistance can be delivered is more difficult to answer. This review did not cover the relevant literature pertaining to (or the lessons learned from) recent donor programming in the security and justice sectors, but there are a number of implications of this review's findings for how donors engage in these sectors.

Despite the burgeoning literature, it is important to recognise that there is still much that we do *not* know about how shortfalls in security and justice affect poor people's welfare. Much of the existing knowledge is focused either on broad societal trends or on individuals and the ways in which security and justice shortfalls affect their livelihood choices and their welfare. This gap between the micro and macro needs to be addressed in order to better understand, for instance, how the

insecurity faced by individuals affects their households and, in turn, the wider communities of which they are a part.

Another important knowledge gap relates to the prevalence of 'self-help' responses to security and justice shortfalls (particularly common in Africa). The tendency is to focus on how militias and vigilante groups *directly* undermine security within the communities where they operate. We need to understand more about the indirect consequences of self-help activities on community welfare, where labour has been diverted from other productive sectors (such as agriculture) to providing security. A simple example of this would be the case where farmers participate in night-time patrols to protect their communities, thus undermining their productivity in the fields during the day.

Another example would be the extent to which self-help security and justice provisioning is being turned into alternative careers and jobs (or replacing other productive activities such as agriculture, artisanal occupations, etc) for poor people. In short, how, when and why poor people (especially youth) may be making careers out of security and justice shortfalls is something we need to know more about.

The above also generates a need to look at which aspects of security and justice provisioning relate to or affect directly, and in substantial ways, the key socio-economic activities associated with poor people. In most cases, the informal economic sector readily comes to mind because that is where most poor people pursue their livelihoods. Yet the focus of much donor-supported security and justice programming is on the formal sector and on formal security and justice institutions. More knowledge is required about the security and justice practices which prevail in the informal sector and their consequences for poverty alleviation.

While a focus on women and children is important from the point of view of DfID programming, there is a need to further disaggregate the findings of research on security and justice to cover other groups which make up the 'poor'. For instance, there is relatively little focus on youth, the elderly and young men. Even though women and children are generally considered to be the most vulnerable groups, the failure of societies to address the

security and justice needs (or perceived needs) of youth and young men, in particular, may push them to resort to livelihood choices (such as joining militia groups) that have devastating implications for the broader communities of which they are a part.

The anti-state bias (implicit in many cases) of much research on security and justice issues is problematic. Because the failings of the state (and political elites) are usually seen as a direct cause of shortfalls in security justice, the tendency is to assume that the solutions must be found outside the state arena. There is a need for more analysis of where increased awareness of and provision of security and justice by states has been a key element (i.e. in Rwanda following the genocide) in terms of improving the welfare of populations and progress in meeting the MDGs. How can the security and justice roles of the state be shored up, taking into account the reality of non-state justice and security provision?

Other areas of concern which arise from our review are more methodological in nature. It is not clear, for instance, what the best way is to map the policy terrain in terms of the parameters of security and justice programming, either broadly (as it relates to the economic and institutional development of countries) or in a more restricted manner that relates to the poverty reduction agenda, including the MDGs. For instance, should crime, violence and corruption be the focus of security and justice programming, or should this include a broader emphasis on issues such as judicial independence, investment laws, etc. all of which indirectly and in a more structural manner have an impact on the welfare of the more vulnerable groups in societies? As such there are major definitional, methodological and conceptual issues still to be resolved.

Finally, much of the literature (and hence, the empirical base for security and justice programming) which we examined is generated outside the regions being examined, often by international consultants. This is not to suggest that this analysis or evidence is not necessarily accurate or useful, but rather it suggests that there are weak foundations in these regions for the assistance programmes donors would like to implement. Unless donors invest in strengthening the capacity of local actors to research, understand and debate their own problems, it is unlikely that local actors will be as receptive to outside assistance as they might otherwise be.

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Notes

- ¹ To date, this research has resulted in three global reports, over twenty national reports, a study on the impact of poverty on the quality of health, and several background reports. These can be accessed at: <http://go.worldbank.org/H1N8746X10>.
- ² Narayan 1999: 1-3.
- ³ Narayan, et al 1999: 174-182.
- ⁴ UNODC 2005: 72-74.
- ⁵ Richards 2005: 576-579; Richards and Peters 1997: 183-210.
- ⁶ Mkandawire 2002: 181-183.
- ⁷ CSDG 2009 (forthcoming).
- ⁸ Donini et al, 2005: 53.
- ⁹ Donini, A., et al, June 2005: 44.
- ¹⁰ Cox 2008:39.
- ¹¹ HRW, December 2008.1-13.
- ¹² HRW, November 2008: 2-20.
- ¹³ HRW, January 2009. 9-16.
- ¹⁴ HRW, December 2008.
- ¹⁵ Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001: 7-18.
- ¹⁶ Murshed 2002: 387-389.
- ¹⁷ Stewart 2003:325-351, 2004: 2-6.
- ¹⁸ Picciotto 2006: 114-116.
- ¹⁹ UN ECOSOC 18 January 2008, para.1.
- ²⁰ CICS 2005: 5-8.
- ²¹ Collier et al 2003: 2 ; 2004a ; 2004b.
- ²² UNODC 2008: 105-108.
- ²³ UNODC 2008: 112-114.
- ²⁴ UN 2008: 7.
- ²⁵ <http://www.hicn.org/>
- ²⁶ Ibanez and Moya 2006: 23-24.
- ²⁷ Kondylis 2008: 1-4.
- ²⁸ Kondylis 2007: 21-22.
- ²⁹ Verwimp and Bundervoet 2008: 1-3.
- ³⁰ Akresh and Verwimp 2006: 19-20.
- ³¹ Akresh and de Walque 2008: 3.
- ³² Shemyakina 2006: 1-2.
- ³³ Justino and Verwimp 2007: 2.
- ³⁴ UNODC March 2008: 7-12.
- ³⁵ UNODC October 2008: 3-31.
- ³⁶ UNODC November 2008: 3-4.
- ³⁷ UNODC 2008: 31.
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- ⁴¹ ICG January 2009: 7-9.
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- ⁴⁵ ICG January 2007: 1-6.
- ⁴⁶ ICG October 2007: 22-24.